In crypto, recovery, and backup strategies are as crucial as the security measures safeguarding the wallets. So instead of a system where secrets leave the protection of a secure enclave or secure element chip, it’s feasible to design systems where a second set of keys can recover funds when needed…

Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other blockchains use the ECDSA algorithm for transaction signatures. A crucial aspect of ECDSA’s security is the use of a random number in each signature it generates. However, if this number isn’t genuinely random — for instance, if it’s repeated or if attackers can predict it due…

Massimiliano Taverna and Kenneth G. Paterson published "Snapping Snap Sync: Practical Attacks on Go Ethereum Synchronising Node", a paper uncovering flaws in Ethereum networks (only PoW chains, pre Merge) that could trick a node into syncing with a malicious chain, enabling an attacker to craft an arbitrary Ethereum state for…

A high-impact hack recently targeted MyAlgo, a web-based Algorand wallet, affecting thousands of users. Our team at Coinspect has voluntarily collaborated with the wallet provider in a good-faith effort to identify the root cause. We are proud to say we identified one particular attack that matches the incidents reported. …

Welcome to our second article on Security Considerations for Ethereum Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) platforms. As we explored previously, there are multiple security challenges associated with delegated staking, nearly all related to the excessive trust expected by staking platforms. In this post, we’ll delve into what led us to…

We at Coinspect are excited to announce the release of our new code repository, learn-evm-attacks! This repository is an educational resource for anyone who wants to learn more about Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) exploits and vulnerabilities. We have reproduced more than 30 attacks on EVM chains: most of them actually…

As the number of platforms offering delegated Ethereum validators as a service grows, so does the interest in evaluating its associated risks. This post aims to help users interested in these services, as well as professionals reviewing or building such platforms. We will discuss the risk associated with: The high-trust…

In September 2021, Tempus engaged Coinspect to perform a third-party source code review of the smart contracts that comprise ther on-chain derivatives marketplace. No high-risk vulnerabilities that would result in stolen users funds were identified. However, one medium-risk issue (high impact, but low likelihood) was reported that could impact user funds if current security assumptions change in the future. Another medium-risk issue was reported related to the power the pool owners possess to update fees without constraints and that could be abused to harm users if the account were compromised.

In February 2021, Incognito engaged Coinspect to perform a source code review of the smart contracts that comprise the Incognito-Ethereum bridge. The main contracts are: IncognitoProxy: stores beacon and bridge committee members of the Incognito Chain, and other contracts can query this contract to check if an instruction is confirmed on the Incognito Chain. Vault: responsible for deposits and withdrawals; it holds assets (Ether or ERC20 tokens) and emits events that the Incognito Chain interprets as minting instructions; and when presented with a burn proof created over at the Incognito Chain, it releases the assets back to the user.